In re: Asbesto Products by unknown
2017 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
12-28-2017 
In re: Asbesto Products 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017 
Recommended Citation 
"In re: Asbesto Products" (2017). 2017 Decisions. 1193. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017/1193 
This December is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 




 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






IN RE: ASBESTOS PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION (No. VI) 
 
                   JOSEPH E. BLUE; GEORGE A. PERDREAUVILLE, 
                                                              Appellants 
__________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Nos. 2-11-cv-33914, 2-11-cv-33906, and 2-02-md-00875) 
District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno 
__________________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 11, 2017 
 
Before: VANASKIE, RENDELL, and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
 






VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.   
 This case has its genesis in the late 1980s when Appellants George Perdreauville 
and Joseph Blue filed lawsuits in the United States District Court for the Northern 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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District of Ohio against the Appellees under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 et seq., and 
general maritime law, alleging injury from exposure to asbestos while onboard the 
Appellees’ various ships.  A lengthy and complex procedural course ensued, and, in 
1991, the suits were consolidated in the Asbestos Multidistrict Litigation (“MDL”) in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  In 2014, that Court 
dismissed the Appellants’ cases due to lack of personal jurisdiction.  Perdreauville and 
Blue subsequently filed this timely joint appeal, arguing, inter alia, that the Appellees 
had waived their personal jurisdiction defenses.   
We addressed precisely the same issue in a 2016 decision involving three different 
MDL plaintiffs.   See In re: Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig., 661 F. App’x 173 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(the “Braun” opinion).  There, we agreed with the argument now put forth by the 
Appellants and reversed the district court on grounds that the Braun appellees had waived 
their personal jurisdiction defenses.  Upon review of Braun and its application to the facts 
at issue, we will reverse in the instant case as well.   
I.  
  Joining several thousand other seamen, Appellants Perdreauville and Blue 
commenced litigation in the Northern District of Ohio against various shipowner 
defendants in the late 1980s.  Appellants alleged that they had suffered damages after 
being exposed to asbestos onboard the defendants’ vessels.  Eventually, the cases were 
consolidated in the Northern District of Ohio’s Maritime Docket (“MARDOC”) before 
Judge Thomas Lambros.  These various MARDOC plaintiffs, including Perdreauville and 
Blue, were represented by one firm––the Jaques Admiralty Law Firm.  The vast majority 
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of the MARDOC defendants, including Appellees Delta Steamship Lines, Inc. (“Delta”), 
f/k/a Mississippi Shipping Co., Inc. (“Mississippi Shipping”), and Farrell Lines 
Incorporated (“Farrell”) (together, the “Shipowner Appellees”), were represented by the 
firm Thompson, Hine, & Flory LLP.1  
 In 1989, Thompson, Hine, & Flory LLP moved on behalf of the Shipowner 
Appellees in the Perdreauville case (though not in the Blue case) to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction.  Judge Lambros thereafter held two hearings on the issue and ruled 
that the Northern District of Ohio did not have personal jurisdiction over a significant 
number of the defendants, including Delta.  Rather than dismissing the cases outright, 
however, Judge Lambros afforded time so that plaintiffs could indicate “where each case 
should be transferred and the defendants could decide if they preferred to remain in the 
Northern District of Ohio by waiving their personal jurisdiction defenses.”  In re: 
Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig., 661 F. App’x at 174.  
 In the months that followed, Judge Lambros issued two orders: MARDOC Order 
40 and MARDOC Order 41. The former was issued on November 22, 1989, and directed 
the plaintiffs to “report the choice of forum” for each case slated for transfer.  (App. 582.)  
It further stated that an appropriate transfer order would be issued in December 1989 and 
                                              
1 Various corporate mergers and name-changes have taken place since the 
commencement of this case.  Delta Steamship Lines, In. (“Delta”), f/k/a Mississippi 
Shipping Co., Inc., has since merged into Crowley Marine Services, Inc.  Farrell Lines 
Incorporated (“Farrell”) is the successor by merger to American Export Lines Inc., f/k/a 






that “[p]arties who, upon reconsideration of their motions to dismiss or transfer, wish[ed] 
to remain in this jurisdiction[,] need only file answers to the complaints” in order to 
remain in the Northern District of Ohio.  Id.  
The latter order, MARDOC Order 41, was filed about a month later and again 
recognized “the insufficiency of minimal state contacts to invoke in personam 
jurisdiction” over a number of defendants in Ohio.  Id. at 585.  On that basis, MARDOC 
Order 41 authorized the transfer of the cases involving those defendants to jurisdictions 
which, according to the plaintiffs, had “sufficient contact [with the defendants] to sustain 
. . . in personam jurisdiction . . . .”  Id.  Included among the group of cases to be 
transferred were those filed by the Appellants.  Id. at 607–09, 616–17. 
 The Shipowner Appellees, however, chose neither to submit to transfer nor to 
waive their personal jurisdiction defense.  Instead,  Thompson, Hine, & Flory LLP filed 
on behalf of its clients––including the Shipowner Appellees––Master Answer No. 1, 
averring as an affirmative defense that the Northern District of Ohio “lack[ed] personal 
jurisdiction over [each] defendant due to insufficient contacts of [the] defendant with” the 
forum state.  Id. at 1207.  The Shipowner Appellees subsequently adopted Master Answer 
No. 1 as to both Perdreauville and Blue.  Id. at 1224, 1233.  
Litigation proceeded in the Northern District of Ohio throughout the remainder of 
1990 and, during that time, Judge Lambros divided the various suits into specific 
“clusters” to aid case management.  On January 8, 1991, the parties appeared before 
Judge Lambros––who by then had become the Chief Judge of his District––to address 
how the clusters should proceed to trial.  Because the statements made at this proceeding 
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proved to be the linchpin of our holding in Braun, and, as explained in detail below, the 
same statements from that January 1991 hearing apply with equal force to this case, it is 
worth quoting the following passage from Braun in full, as it thoroughly recounts the 
pertinent sequence of events vis-à-vis the issue of personal jurisdiction:  
At the beginning of the hearing, [the parties] talked about how 
they would proceed with the first cluster of twenty cases, four 
of which had already been tried to a jury in the Northern 
District of Ohio.  After much discussion, it was resolved that 
the remaining sixteen cases from [that] cluster would be tried 
to [the] same jury in the Northern District of Ohio, a United 
States Magistrate Judge would preside over thirteen of the 
trials, and the remaining three trials would occur before Judge 
Lambros . . . . 
 
During the hearing Chief Judge Lambros made clear that he 
intended to transfer four clusters of cases to the Eastern District 
of Michigan for pretrial administration and trial . . . . After an 
intervening discussion about the possibility of settlements and 
the process for appealing verdicts in the sixteen cases that were 
set to be tried in the Northern District of Ohio, the conversation 
returned to the four clusters that were to be transferred to the 
Eastern District of Michigan.  Chief Judge Lambros explained 
there was at that time a “Michigan cluster” and an “Ohio 
cluster,” each made up of several sub-clusters.  App. [702].  
The former would “be transmitted to” the Eastern District of 
Michigan, and “the management of those cases will be left to 
the discretion of the Detroit judges.”  App. [702].  As to the 
Ohio cluster, “pretrial management matters, scheduling 
matters, [and] discovery matters” would be referred to a 
Magistrate Judge in the Northern District of Ohio.  App. [702]. 
 
In re: Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig., 661 F. App’x at 175.   
 Following a brief discussion about costs, severance, and third-party practice, 
counsel from Thompson, Hine, & Flory LLP clarified to the court that the Shipowner 
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Appellees “did not agree or concede to trials of any of these cases in Detroit.”  (App. 
722.)  Counsel continued:  
We had put our objection on the record before, but trials of the 
Ohio cases in Detroit are something that our clients waived 
jurisdictional objections to proceed here in Cleveland.  To go 
to Detroit is something they don’t agree to.  
 
Id.  Counsel for all of the defendants then confirmed on the record their agreement with 
that objection.  
 Notwithstanding the Shipowner Appellees’ objection, Chief Judge Lambros issued 
Ohio Asbestos Litigation (“OAL”) Order 125 the next day, transferring four clusters of 
cases––including the Appellants’––to the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan.  The Shipowner Appellees promptly moved to vacate Chief Judge 
Lambros’ Order, asserting that the cases “should be retained for pretrial management and 
trial in Cleveland.”  Id. at 752.  Chief Judge Lambros denied the motion, prompting the 
Shipowner Appellees to file a similar motion in the Eastern District of Michigan 
requesting that the cases be returned to the Northern District of Ohio.  The Magistrate 
Judge to whom the motions were referred recommended that the Shipowner Appellees’ 
Motions to Retransfer be held in abeyance, a recommendation that the Shipowner 
Appellees likewise objected to in a subsequent filing that requested “retransfer [of] all 40 
Ohio cases to Ohio for handling . . . .”  Id. at 820.  
 Eventually, in 1991, the Asbestos MDL was created in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.  The Shipowner Appellees opposed the transfer of the MARDOC cases to 
the Asbestos MDL and urged the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“JPML”) to 
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consolidate the cases in the Northern District of Ohio.  In a filing with the JPML, counsel 
requested on behalf of the Shipowner Appellees, “[i]f transfer is to take place, . . . that it 
be to the Northern District of Ohio” because “[p]rocedures already are in place for the 
pretrial management of seamen’s asbestos cases, and this is the district in which the 
largest number of seamen’s cases is pending.”  Id. at 902.  Notwithstanding the 
Shipowner Appellees’ objection, the MARDOC cases were transferred to the Asbestos 
MDL, see In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 417–18 (J.P.M.L. 
1991), where they sat dormant until 2011 when Judge Robreno reactivated them.  
 Throughout 2012 to 2014, the Shipowner Appellees filed motions to dismiss based 
upon lack of personal jurisdiction in the Appellants’ cases.  In Perdreauville’s case, Judge 
Robreno granted the Shipowner Appellees’ motion and dismissed the case via a 
Memorandum and Order dated March 12, 2014.  See Jacobs v. A–C Prod. Liab. Tr., No. 
2 MDL 875, 2014 WL 944227 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014).  On October 10, 2014, Judge 
Robreno dismissed Blue’s case as well, citing both Jacobs and Bartel v. Various 
Defendants, 965 F. Supp. 2d 612 (E.D. Pa. 2013) for his reasoning and conclusions.  
(App. 5.)  In Jacobs and Bartel, Judge Robreno ruled that the defendants “had preserved 
their personal jurisdiction defenses because they had raised the issue throughout the 
litigation and there was no evidence to show that they had waived their defenses” as to 
the relevant plaintiffs.  In re: Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig., 661 F. App’x at 176.  
Moreover, Judge Robreno interpreted the defendants’ “opposition to the consolidation of 
the MARDOC cases in the Asbestos MDL simply as resistance to the Asbestos MDL, not 
as affirmative consent to litigate in Ohio.”  Id.  Following the dismissal of their cases, 
8 
 
Perdreauville and Blue filed this timely joint appeal challenging Judge Robreno’s 
decision to grant the Shipowner Appellees’ motions to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction.  
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a trial court’s determination as to 
waiver of personal jurisdiction for abuse of discretion.  In re: Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig., 
661 F. App’x at 176–77 (citing Lechoslaw v. Bank of Am., N.A., 618 F.3d 49, 55–56 (1st 
Cir. 2010); Hamilton v. Atlas Turner, Inc., 197 F.3d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1999); United States 
v. Ziegler Bolt & Parts Co., 111 F.3d 878, 882 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).  “A court abuses its 
discretion when its decision ‘rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant 
conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.’”  Id. (quoting Sharp v. 
Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 158 n.19 (3d Cir. 2012). 
III. 
 As both parties acknowledge, we addressed the question of whether the Shipowner 
Appellees waived their personal jurisdiction defenses in Braun.2  The Shipowner 
Appellees urge us to depart from Braun, contending that the Panel “paid only lip service” 
to the abuse of discretion standard by failing to “identif[y] how Judge Robreno’s findings 
                                              
2 Indeed, counsel in the instant case also represented the parties in Braun.  
Additionally, the reasoning and conclusions forming the basis of the instant appeal––i.e., 
the District Court’s opinions in Jacobs v. A–C Prod. Liab. Tr., No 2 MDL 875, 2014 WL 
944227 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) and Bartel v. Various Defendants, 965 F. Supp. 2d 612 
(E.D. Pa. 2013)––likewise formed the basis of the appellants’ appeal in Braun.  
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of fact were clearly erroneous so as to constitute an abuse of discretion.”  Appellees’ Br. 
at 31.  Moreover, the Shipowner Appellees maintain that Braun not only “substitute[ed] 
its own factual conclusions for those of the MDL court,” but further drew “illogical and 
erroneous” conclusions from those facts.  Id. at 32.  As we explain below, however, 
Braun carefully applied the abuse of discretion standard and clearly articulated the 
precise reasons as to why the record did not support Judge Robreno’s conclusions.  
A.  
In Braun, three plaintiffs appealed Judge Robreno’s dismissal of their claims for 
lack of personal jurisdiction.  See In re: Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig., 661 F. App’x at 174.   
We reversed and remanded, finding that the defendants had waived their personal 
jurisdiction defenses at the January 8, 1991, hearing before Chief Judge Lambros.  Id. at 
178–79.  Underlying our conclusion were three critical facts that plainly contradicted 
Judge Robreno’s interpretation of the record: First, we explained that waiver occurred 
when counsel for the Braun defendants consented to proceed with “these cases” in the 
Northern District of Ohio because that statement “clearly refer[red] to the clusters [of 
cases] that Chief Judge Lambros intended to transfer to the Eastern District of Michigan . 
. . .” Id. at 177.  “This is apparent,” we indicated, because defense counsel “specifically 
opposed transfer of ‘these cases’ to Detroit, and the earlier mentions of Detroit at the 
hearing related only to those clusters that Chief Judge Lambros intended to transfer to the 
Eastern District of Michigan.”  Id. (emphasis in original).3  In other words, when counsel 
                                              
3 To support this interpretation, we cited two statements made by Chief Judge 
Lambros during the hearing, namely: (1) that he “ha[d] been in very close touch with 
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for the Braun defendants acknowledged that they had consented to jurisdiction in the 
Northern District of Ohio, they did so in reference to the cases that were at risk of being 
transferred by Chief Judge Lambros to Michigan.  We concluded, therefore, that 
counsel’s consent to proceed with litigation in Ohio amounted to “a clear waiver of the 
personal jurisdiction defense . . . .”  Id. at 178.  
 Second, we opined that Judge Robreno’s interpretation of the hearing transcript–– 
i.e., his assessment that defense counsel’s reference to “these cases” was limited to the 
sixteen cases set for trial in the Northern District of Ohio––was belied by the record.  In 
fact, Chief Judge Lambros never suggested that the remaining sixteen cases from the first 
cluster were at risk of being transferred to Michigan; to the contrary, it was decided on 
the record that all sixteen cases would be tried to the same Ohio jury that heard the first 
four cases from that cluster.  Id.   
 Third, we stated in Braun that the defendants’ post-transfer filings further 
confirmed that they had waived their personal jurisdiction defenses because, in those 
filings, they specifically requested that the cases be transferred from the Eastern District 
of Michigan and the JPML to Ohio.  Id.  In sum, we concluded in Braun that Judge 
Robreno’s decision was “a further stretch than what . . . the facts support,” namely: that 
                                              
Chief Judge Julian Cook” of the Eastern District of Michigan, and that the judges of the 
Eastern District of Michigan “[were] asking [the Northern District of Ohio Court] to pack 
up the first four clusters” and to send them “to Detroit” (App. 661–62); and (2) that the 
management of the Michigan cluster would “be left to the discretion of the Detroit 




the shipowner defendants “waived their personal jurisdiction defenses and wished to 
proceed to trial in the Northern District of Ohio.” 4  Id. at 177–78. (footnote omitted).  
B.  
 Upon a review of Braun, we find that its reasoning and conclusion bear upon the 
Appellants’ case as well.  For one, the claims brought by Appellants Perdreauville and 
Blue––like those filed by the Braun plaintiffs––were among those at risk of being 
transferred from Ohio to Michigan in January 1991.  (App. 652–53.)  The Shipowner 
Appellees, in turn, were represented by the same Thompson, Hine, & Flory LLP attorney 
who consented at the January 8, 1991, hearing to jurisdiction in the Northern District of 
Ohio.  As explained above, this acknowledgement was a clear waiver of the Shipowner 
Appellees’ lack of personal jurisdiction defenses.  Taken together, these facts establish 
that the Shipowner Appellees here––like those in Braun––indeed waived their lack of 
personal jurisdiction defenses with regard to the Appellants’ cases.  
 Second, the Shipowner Appellees’ post-transfer filings confirm that they, like their 
counterparts in Braun, equally waived their personal jurisdiction defenses with respect to 
the Appellants.  As a case in point, the Shipowner Appellees objected to OAL Order 
125––which transferred 44 cases, including the Appellants’, to the Eastern District of 
Michigan––by filing a motion to vacate OAL Order 125 and have the cases “retained for 
                                              
4 Our colleagues in the Sixth Circuit reviewed our holding in Braun and reached 
the same conclusion, stating: “The Third Circuit correctly determined that the MDL court 
clearly erred when it found that the objection to transfer out of the N.D. of Ohio from the 
January 8, 1991, hearing pertains only to sixteen cases that were not before the MDL 




pretrial management and trial in Cleveland.”  (App. 752.) (emphasis added).  These 
filings, coupled with the clear waiver outlined above, lead us to conclude that the 
Shipowner Appellees waived their personal jurisdiction defenses.5    
IV.  
 For the reasons set forth above, we vacate the order dismissing Appellants’ cases 
for lack of personal jurisdiction, and remand this matter for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
                                              
5 Because of this ruling, we do not reach Appellants’ law-of-the-case argument. 
